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CIVIL COURT OF THE CITY OF NEW YORK
COUNTY OF QUEENS: HOUSING PART A
A & J ESTATES INC.,
Petitioner-Landlord

Index No. L&T 308649/21
DECISION/ORDER

-againstGARTH GRINDELY,
Respondent-Tenants,
JOHN DOE & JANE DOE,
Respondent-Undertenant(s).
Hon. Jeannine Baer Kuzniewski
Recitation, as required by CPLR 2219(A), of the papers considered in the review of this
Notice of Motion:
PAPERS
NUMBERED
NOTICE OF MOTION AND AFFIDAVITS ANNEXED
ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE AND AFFIRMATION ANNEXED
1
ANSWER AFFIRMATION
REPLYING AFFIRMATION
EXHIBITS
STIPULATIONS
OTHER
Transfer Order NYSCEF document 8
2
Upon the foregoing cited papers, the Decision/Order on the respondent’s motion in this
holdover proceeding which seeks leave to reargue CPLR §2221(d) is as follows:
The petitioner commenced this holdover proceeding seeking possession of the
premises at 157-12 110th Avenue, Apt # 2, Jamaica, NY 11433. The petitioner alleged to have
terminated the tenancy by serving a Ninety Day Notice of Termination. The Affidavit of Service
states that service was effectuated:
“by affixing a true copy of each to the door of said premises. which is
RECIPIENTS residence within the state. Deponent was unable, with due diligence
to find recipient or a person of suitable age and discretion thereat, having called
there
Attempts were made on; AUGUST 26. 202.1 at 7:16 PM
AUGUST 27. 2021 at 9:04 AM
AUGUST 27, 2021 at 12:37 PM - AFFIXED
TO DOOR
1

MAILING TO RESIDENCE Within 1 day of such delivery or affixing, deponent
enclosed a copy of the same in a postpaid envelope properly addressed to recipient
at recipient's last known residence, at 157-12 I 10™ AVENUE. APT #2.
JAMAICA. NY 11433 and deposited said envelope in an official depository under
the exclusive care and custody of the U.S. Postal Service within New York.”1
Similarly, the Petition and Notice of Petition were served by “nail and mail”.
“The respondent(s) were served by affixing separate true copies for each
respondent, to the door of the premises sought to be recovered. At the time of said
service, deponent rang the bell and/or knocked on the door but received no reply.
After reasonable application, deponent was unable to find the aforementioned
respondent(s) or a person of suitable age and discretion who was willing to accept
service at the above address, having previously attempted service at: 157-12 110™
AVE, APT. 2, JAMAICA, NY 11433
First Attempt Date: 12/28/21 First Attempt Time: 8:35 PM
Second Attempt Date: 12/29/21 Second Attempt Time: 2:00 PM
Third Attempt Date: 12/30/21 Third Attempt Time: 11:15 AM
That on 12/31/21, deponent mailed true copies … .” 2

The respondent, represented by counsel, moved for dismissal for lack of personal
jurisdiction arguing that the petitioner’s process servers failed to exercise due diligence in the
service of both the Notice of Termination and the Petition and Notice of Petition as statutorily
required pursuant to the amended CEEFPA Part C, Subpart A, §3(2) of Chapter 417 of the Laws
of 2021 (the "Act"). On March 24, 2022 this Court transferred the proceeding to Part X for
assignment to a trial part for a traverse hearing. The respondent now moves to reargue that act by
the Court. The movant argues that the Court misapplied and misapprehended the law by
transferring the proceeding for a traverse hearing rather than addressing the motion to dismiss, as
it is asserted that the affidavits are defective on their face, for failing to comply with the due
diligence standard.
Upon a review of the papers before the Court, reargument is granted.
The NYS legislature amended the COVID 19 Emergency Eviction and Foreclosure
Prevention Act which was thereafter amended on September 1, 2021. One of the provisions
provided:
“Service of the notice of petition with the attached copies of the
hardship declaration and affidavits shall be made by personal delivery
to the respondent, unless such service cannot be made with due diligence, in which
1 NYSCEF document #1.
2 NYSCEF document 4.

2

case service may be made under section 735 of the real property actions and
proceedings law.”
The question before the Court is whether the Affidavits of Service are defective on their
face by simply resorting to three attempts at personal service before resorting to nail and mail?
Primarily it is argued that the affidavits are defective as they fail to allege that the process server
made any attempts to ascertain the respondents whereabouts or place of employment. It is further
argued that the process server made all attempts during the week rather than making at least one
attempt on a weekend.
“The landlord bears the burden of establishing that personal jurisdiction over the
tenant was acquired and must show that the process server made genuine inquiries
about the tenant's whereabouts and place of employment (see Greene Major
Holdings, LLC, 148 AD3d at 1320-1321). Here, the record reflects that landlord's
process server attempted to serve tenant only at the subject premises on three
occasions and made no attempt to serve her at her place of employment or new
residence. Under the circumstances, the due diligence requirements of CPLR 308
(4) were not met.”3
The caselaw dictates:
“This Court has repeatedly emphasized that "the due diligence requirement
of CPLR 308 (4) must be strictly observed, given the reduced likelihood that a
summons served pursuant to that section will be received" (Gurevitch v
Goodman, 269 AD2d 355, 355, 702 NYS2d 634 [2000]; see County of Nassau v
Letosky, 34 AD3d 414, 415, 824 NYS2d 153 [2006]; O'Connell v Post, 27 AD3d
630, 631, 811 NYS2d 441 [2006]; Lemberger v Khan, 18 AD3d 447, 794 NYS2d
416 [2005]; see generally Estate of Waterman v Jones, 46 AD3d 63, 843 NYS2d
462 [2007]). What constitutes due diligence is determined on a case-by-case basis,
focusing not on the quantity of the attempts at personal delivery, but on their
quality (see Estate of Waterman v Jones, 46 AD3d at 66).”4

This Court agrees with my colleague who determined that:
“The fact that the Legislature does not explicitly refer to C.P.L.R. §308(4) does not
mean that the Legislature did not intend for the standard derived from that
provision of the law to attach. Requiring a process server to exercise due diligence
as derived from C.P.L.R. §308(4) would be more harmonious to the legislative
intent as opposed to the interpretation proposed by Petitioner. ‘In the construction
3 Merrbill Holdings, LLC v Toscano, 59 Misc 3d 129[A], 2018 NY Slip Op 50410[U], *2 [App Term 2018]
4 Id.

3

of statutory provisions, the legislative intent is the great and controlling
principle.’ Matter of Albano v. Kirby, 36 N.Y.2d 526, 529-30, 330 N.E.2d 615, 369
N.Y.S.2d 655 (1975). One must be mindful of the spirit and purpose of the statute
along with the objectives of the enactors when interpreting a statute. See id. at 53031. [T]he enacting body will be presumed to have inserted every provision for
some useful purpose.’ Id. at 530. See also McGowan v. Mayor of City of N.Y., 53
N.Y.2d 86, 423 N.E.2d 18, 440 N.Y.S.2d 595 (1981). To interpret that the
Legislature meant ‘due diligence’ to be a term other than the legal term of art
commonly associated with personal service, along with the
accompanying standard, when the Legislature is, in fact, addressing
personal service would be nonsensible. If the Legislature intended only service by
R.P.A.P.L. §735, then it would surely have not used the term ‘due diligence.’
Hence, the court reads the ‘due diligence’ requirement in the Act as having the
same meaning as the ‘due diligence’ standard mentioned in C.P.L.R. §308(4). See,
e.g., Seward Park Housing Corp. v. Cohen, 287 A.D.2d 157, 734 N.Y.S.2d 42 (1st
Dep't 2001) … .”5
Weighing the arguments asserted by the respondent and the applicable statutes and case
law, the Court grants the motion to dismiss. The Appellate Term, Second Department, has
determined that:
"The process server has an affirmative duty to make genuine inquiries to ascertain
a defendant's whereabouts … In doing so, the court held that satisfaction of
‘due diligence’ required genuine inquiries into the defendant's whereabouts and
place of employment (id.). The court noted that the plaintiff, the defendant's former
landlord, ‘would be in a position to have knowledge of defendant's employer or be
in possession of information which may help identify defendant's place of
employment’(id.).”6

Pursuant to the foregoing, the motion to reargue is granted. Upon reconsideration
the motion to dismiss is granted upon the failure to use “due diligence” in effectuating
service of the Notice of Termination and the Petition and Notice of Petition. The
proceeding is dismissed without prejudice.

Dated: August 8, 2022
Hon. Jeannine Baer Kuzniewski, J.H.C.

5 421 Mott LLC v. Cherry, 2022 NYLJ LEXIS 441, *7-8
6 Bel Air Leasing LP v Johnston, 73 Misc 3d 809, 812 [Civ Ct, Kings County 2021]
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